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selected for their inspection, because they should find our Lord elsewhere frequently employing language equally strong and explicit, and which must be understood *metaphorically*; and they should, accordingly, be exposed to the risk of suspecting that, in the case of the eucharist also, a metaphorical meaning was much more probable than the existence of a mystery which it took the Church many centuries to discover—the mystery of transubstantiation. *Policy* would here, also, dictate the propriety of refusing the people unrestrained access to such dangerous sources of information; and, assuming (which it is very hard to do) that the heads of the Church of Rome really believe this doctrine, we can have no difficulty in admitting that their *duty* requires them to withhold from the faithful what must, inevitably, lead them to question its truth.

These instances are sufficient for our purpose. The case, then, stands thus: if the characteristic doctrines and practices of the Church of Rome be true, it is at once her policy and her duty to disconcert the general circulation and reading of the Scriptures. These writings, interpreted according to the ordinary rules of criticism, and in the sense which a person of average intelligence and unprejudiced judgment would elicit from them, do not bear out—nay, often directly contradict—the doctrines and practices in question. In order that there may be anything like an agreement between the Word of God and the peculiar dogmas of Romanism, the former must be interpreted in a way which none but the initiated have any idea of, and which utterly transcends the capacities of the vulgar multitude. “*Procul, o procul este profani;*” is, accordingly, the language of the privileged class to whom belongs the unfolding of the mystic pages of Scripture. The Bible, say they in effect, and even in express words, is a grand enigma, which no individual Christian can venture to unravel, except at the imminent risk of making shipwreck of his faith. One renowned Romish theologian calls it a “Sibyl’s prophecy;” another, “riddles of the Sphinx;” a third, “aleadon rule;” a fourth, “a nose of wax,” which may be twisted backwards and forwards, and moulded into any shape; a fifth informs us that, without the sanction of the Church, Scripture could no more claim to be received than the Fables of *Aesop*; and a sixth asserts that it has no higher internal evidence than the Koran. If all this be true, it is not to be wondered at that the unsophisticated vulgar should be withheld from too close contact with a book so dangerous in its tendency; and the Church only fulfills a plain duty in protecting her children from the perilous consequences that must result from its free study.

But if the Bible contain a *revelation* of God, designed to make known to the world His will and purposes, so far as He condescends to make them known; if it be written by men supernaturally endowed for the express purpose of conveying the revelation free from all human error and imperfection; if these men wrote, as they manifestly did write, in a way which they conceived to be level to the capacities of the generality of Christians, without mystical subtleties, or enigmatical reserve; if all the ancient Fathers acknowledge the Scriptures to be the plain and unmistakeable rule of faith and practice; and if, notwithstanding, these Scriptures cannot be made to speak the characteristic language of the modern Church of Rome, except by a system of interpretation, which, applied to any other book in the world, would be called forced, unnatural, and inconsistent with itself; then, surely, there is strong reason to suspect that motives of *policy* alone lie at the foundation of the dislike which the Church of Rome evinces to the general diffusion of the written Word of God; and it may be fairly concluded, that if she is influenced by a feeling of *duty*, it is a feeling which cannot be referred to God as its author or its object.

#### ROMAN CATHOLIC MORAL THEOLOGY.

##### No. V.

We have some fear lest many of our readers should have had enough of St. Liguori and his crooked ways, and should be rather tired of the subject of equivocation and mental reservation. However, as what we have said did not contain a full exposure of his doctrines, we venture to devote one article more to the subject. It will be remembered that the teaching we have hitherto considered related to the ordinary intercourse of society between persons who are under no peculiar obligation to each other. In such cases we found the moral teachers of Rome holding that we are not bound to speak the truth, and that any equivocation, short of absolute falsehood, was perfectly innocent. They add, besides, that we may not only utter these equivocations, but also confirm them with an oath; for, as they very logically conclude, if it is no sin to say these things, of course it can be no sin to swear them. However, we are promised a stricter morality in the case of persons who hold a special relation to one another. As we quoted from the *Rambler*, last month, “the relation of a parent to a child, of a master to his servant, of a judge to a witness, of a physician to a voluntary patient, even say of a bankrupt’s creditors to a bankrupt, is quite different to that of persons who are in a condition of perfect equality, and who are bound by no peculiar engagement to one another.”

Let us, then, inquire into the particulars of some of these picked cases, and see what kind of morality is supplied when the dealers of the Church of Rome offer to furnish the article of superior quality and of the

purest description. And the first thing which strikes one as odd in this passage from the *Rambler* is the curious, doubtful way in which the case of a bankrupt is introduced—“even, say, of a bankrupt to his creditors”—as if the obligation in this case were not so great as in the one mentioned before, that of a physician and voluntary patient. We are led to suppose that if a patient, in obtaining the advice of a physician, were to keep concealed some of his ailments, it would be a mortal sin; but that if a bankrupt were to keep concealed some of his property from his creditors, the case would not be so clear. Let us shut up the *Rambler*, and turn to the fountain-head, and see what St. Liguori tells on the subject; and, in fact, we find the saint laying down (iv. 158), that he who wants for his support goods which he has concealed, may answer the judge that he has got none. In like manner, an heir who has concealed goods, without an inventory, if he is not bound to satisfy the creditors out of them, may answer the judge that he has concealed nothing—mentally subjoining, “of the goods out of which he is bound to make satisfaction.” And Liguori is not the only Roman Catholic moralist who is thus indulgent to bankrupts.

The great Blaise Pascal, in the eighth of his celebrated Provincial Letters, alludes to some of them, as follows:—

“I have now to say a little,” cried the monk, “in regard to those who are in embarrassed circumstances. Our casuists have sought to relieve them according to their condition of life. For, if they have not enough of property for a decent maintenance, and at the same time for paying their debts, they permit them to secure a fortune by making a bankruptcy with their creditors.”\* This has been decided by Lessius, and confirmed by Escobar as follows:—

“May a person who turns bankrupt, with a good conscience, keep back as much of his personal estate as may be necessary to maintain his family in a respectable way—*ne indecor vivat*? I hold, with Lessius, that he may, even though he may have acquired his wealth unjustly, and by notorious crimes—*ex iniustitia et notoria delicto*; only, in this case he is not at liberty to retain so large an amount as he otherwise might.”

“Indeed, father! (says Pascal) what a strange sort of charity is this, to allow property to remain in the hands of the man who has acquired it by rapine, to support him in his extravagance, rather than go into the hands of his creditors, to whom it legitimately belongs!”

“It is impossible to please everybody!” replied the father; “and we have made it our particular study to relieve these unfortunate people. This partiality to the poor has induced our great Vasquez, cited by Castro Palao, to say that ‘if one saw a thief going to rob a poor man, it would be lawful to divert him from his purpose by pointing out to him some rich individual, whom he might rob in place of the other.’ If you have not access to Vasquez or Castro Palao, you will find the same thing in your copy of Escobar; for, as you are aware, his work is little more than a compilation from twenty-four of the most celebrated of our fathers. You will find it in his treatise, entitled ‘The Practice of our Society in the matter of Charity towards our Neighbours.’”

“A very singular kind of charity this,” I observed, “to save one from suffering loss by inflicting it upon another! But I suppose that to complete the charity, the charitable adviser would be bound in conscience to restore to the rich man the sum which he had made him lose?”

“Not at all, sir,” returned the monk; “for he did not rob the man—he only advised the other to do it. From such a mass of evidence you ought to be satisfied now of the futility of your objections; but we are losing sight of our subject. To revert, then, to the succour which our fathers apply to persons in straitened circumstances—Lessius, among others, maintains that it is lawful to steal, not only in a case of extreme necessity, but even where the necessity is *grave*, though not extreme.”

“This is somewhat startling, father,” said I. “There are very few people in this world who do not consider their cases of necessity to be *grave* ones, and to whom, accordingly, you would not give the right of stealing with a good conscience. And though you should restrict the permission to those only who are really and truly in that condition, you open the door to an infinite number of petty larcenies, which the magistrates would punish in spite of your ‘grave necessity,’ and which you ought to repress on a higher principle—you who are bound by your office to be the conservators, not of justice only, but of charity, between man and man—a grace which this permission would destroy. For after all, now, is it not a violation of the law of charity, and of our duty to our neighbour, to deprive a man of his property, in order to turn it to our own advantage? Such, at least, is the way I have been taught to think hitherto.”

“That will not always hold true,” replied the monk;

\* The Jesuits exemplified their own maxim in this case by the famous bankruptcy of their College of St. Hermangilde, at Seville. We have a full account of it in the memorial presented to the King of Spain by the luckless creditors. The simple pathos and sincere earnestness of this document preclude all suspicion of the accuracy of its statements. By the advice of their Father Provincial, the Jesuits, in March, 1645, stopped payment, after having borrowed upwards of 450,000 ducats, mostly from poor widows, and friendless girls. This shameful affair was exposed before the courts of justice during a long litigation, in the course of which it was discovered that the Jesuit fathers had been carrying on extensive mercantile transactions, and that, instead of spending the money left them for *pious uses*—such as ransoming captives, and alms-giving—they had devoted it to purposes of what they termed “our poor little house of profession.”

“for our great Molina has taught us that ‘the rule of charity does not bind us to deprive ourselves of a profit, in order thereby to save our neighbour from a corresponding loss.’ He advances this in corroboration of what he has undertaken to prove!—That one is not bound in conscience to restore the goods which another had put into his hands, in order to cheat his creditors.” Lessius holds the same opinion on the same ground.”\*

Let us, however, come on to examine the general case of a witness in a court of justice. We find it laid down here (iv. 154) that, “a witness, not legitimately questioned, may swear that he does not know of a crime which he really does know—mentally subjoining, that he does not know of any crime *legitimately inquired of*; or that he does not know it, *so as to give evidence of it*. The same is the case if the witness, for some other reason, is not bound to give evidence; for example, if he is himself quite assured that the act committed is without guilt, or if he knows the crime only as a secret, and no ill repute has got abroad. When, however, the witness or defendant is legitimately questioned by the judge, he must not use any equivocation, because he is then bound to obey the rightful precept of his superior. This is the common opinion, and the same must be said about an oath in onerous contracts, because otherwise injury would be done to another. Except in the case of a trial, the crime be altogether concealed, for then a witness may, *nay, he is bound to say that the defendant has not committed it*; and so may the defendant, if there is not already half full proof. So says Tamburini, with the common opinion, because then the judge does not question legitimately.”

It will be seen, then, that it is a very important question—When does a judge inquire legitimately? The *Christian Remembrancer* gives the following answer to this, from Garnet’s “Treatise on Equivocation.”† The order of law requires these five things—

“First, that the party who examineth must be a lawful superior. . . . Secondly, he must have authority over the person whom he examineth. . . . Thirdly, the matter itself must be subject to the judge. . . . Fourthly, he must proceed according to a just law, for, whereas a judge is, as Aristotle calls him, a living law, as the law itself is a dumb judge; even as the law, when it is unjust, is no law, so a judge, in the execution of an unjust law, is no judge. Finally, it is very necessary that the judge do not proceed against a man to examine him, or call him into question, but in cases which are public and manifest, or when great suspicions and presumptions, or common reports, do seem to condemn the party, or sufficient testimony convince him.”

So likewise St. Liguori, Lib. v. 276:—

“It is certain that a witness is not bound to confess the truth to a judge, when he does not legitimately interrogate; for, then, he may lawfully answer, even with an oath, that he does not know the crime (aside) *so as to be bound to declare it unto him*. But, it is asked, when does a judge question legitimately? The reply is—when there is already half full proof. When there is this, the crime is no longer said to be secret; and, therefore, the judge has a right that the witness shall declare the truth. So in common, Lessius, Navarrus, and others, with the Salamanca doctors, who observe that no witness is bound to answer in this way, unless repute of the guilt, or half full evidence of it, or clear signs of it be already proved and shown to him by the judge—unless, indeed, it is quite certain that the judge is a good man, and he declares that he is legitimately questioning. . . . A judge does not legitimately question unless there has previously been no-toriety, ill repute, or other half full proof.”

And we are told further on that a witness commits a crime in five ways, one of which is—if he discover the truth which he ought to conceal!!

Let us now test this doctrine of Liguori by a particular example. Many of our readers will remember the trial of Boyle v. Wiseman, which took place last year. The object of the plaintiff was to prove that Cardinal Wiseman was the writer of a certain libellous letter, which had been published with his name; and several witnesses were brought forward, to whom, it was supposed, the Cardinal had confessed his authorship of the letter. The following is a report of part of what occurred:—

“Dr. T. Grant was examined—He said, I am the Roman Catholic Bishop of St. George’s, Southwark; I know the defendant, and am on intimate terms with him; I remember going to Paris on the subject of this libel; but I don’t remember having had any conversation with the defendant relating to it; I had a conversation with a gentleman belonging to the *Univers* journal, but he did not give me any MS.; I am quite sure that the defendant never

\* Molina t. ii, tr. 2, disp. 328, n. 8. Lessius liv. ii, ch. 20, dist. 13, n. 163. Escobar tr. 3, ex. 1, n. 23, tr. 5, ex. 5, n. 53. Pascal adds to this letter that the best editions of Escobar are the Lyons edition, having in the title-page the device of a lamb lying on a book, sealed with seven seals, and the Brussels edition of 1651. There has, however, since Pascal’s time, been a new and corrected edition, printed at Paris, by Piget (see Nicole’s edition of the Provincial Letters). We may here add, that not one of the charges brought against the Jesuits in this eighth letter, has been met by Father Daniel in his celebrated reply.

† The quotations from Liguori which follow are also taken from the same article in the “Christian Remembrancer,” to which we have already expressed our obligations in this series of articles. We happen to write at a distance from the greater part of our books, and the volume of Liguori, here cited, is not at hand.

told me that he wrote the letter which is the subject of the present action.

The Rev. George Spencer, known as Father Ignatius, was examined. He said—"I am intimately acquainted with Cardinal Wiseman, but I don't see much of him. I remember reading the article in the *Catholic Standard*, and I had a few words with the Cardinal on that subject; all I can remember that he said was, that he had reason to know that Boyle had communicated the article that appeared in the *Ami dela Religion*. He did not say a word of the authorship of the letter." "Did you say to him 'I have read your letter, Cardinal Wiseman?'" "I don't remember." (The witness gave his evidence in such a low tone, and so confusedly, that the jury several times requested him to speak louder and more plainly, as they could not hear what he said.) "I cannot say how the conversation began; the Cardinal did not send me to the plaintiff to try to arrange the matter, but I did go to Mr. Ivors on the subject. I don't remember the words that passed afterwards between me and the Cardinal; I am certain he did not tell me the letter was his, and I did not tell him it was his; I went to Mr. Boyle of my own accord, and I afterwards communicated with the Cardinal; my object was, to endeavour to settle this action." "Surely, you can tell us what passed between you." "No; I don't remember." "Why, how long is it since this occurred?" "About a month." "And you mean to swear you have no recollection of what occurred?" "I do—I only recollect what I have told you." "What else did the Cardinal say relative to the matter?" "I don't recollect."

Now, as we know nothing of Dr. Grant or of Father Ignatius, it is very possible that these gentlemen may have particularly bad memories; and it is very possible, too, that they have never opened St. Liguori's works; and it is possible, therefore, that we are to attach the same meaning to their denial which we should give to the statement of any other English gentlemen. But let us consider, as a hypothetical case, and, in order to illustrate St. Liguori's maxims, what evidence ought Dr. Grant and Mr. Spencer to have given according to the principles of Roman Catholic theology, supposing they had recollected that Cardinal Wiseman had told them that he was the author of the letter signed by his name. They must have done exactly what they did; otherwise they would have sinned by discovering the truth which they ought to have concealed (v. 270). *If in a trial the crime is altogether concealed, the witness may, nay, is bound to say, that the defendant has not committed it*, (iv. 154). Now, in the present instance, this was just the case. The trial was, in fact, quashed, because the crime of having written the libel was concealed. Therefore, the witnesses were bound, even if they had known the contrary to be true, to say the defendant had not committed it.

Or, again, suppose that, in the judgment of Dr. Grant the act of writing the libel was not criminal at all, then the judge would not legitimately examine, and he might also deny that the defendant had done what he was accused of.

We think this specimen enough of the "best quality" of Liguori's morality in the cases picked by his advocates: and we now go on to consider the defences which have been made for him.

We shall principally refer to the essays of Dr. Murray of Maynooth, one of which is devoted to the subject of equivocation and mental reservation. It is true that it was not written with any special controversial object, still, as being infinitely more readable than the article in the *Dublin Review*, and as being the source whence the writer in the *Rambler* drew almost all his arguments and illustrations, it is the essay on the Roman Catholic side which is best deserving of attention. Dr. Murray's essay does not refer to St. Liguori in particular; it was written in a fit of indignation at hearing the name of the order of the Jesuits identified with fraud of speech and action; he cites, for instance, Webster's Dictionary as defining JESUITISM—cunning, deceit, hypocrisy, prevarication, deceptive practices to effect a purpose. Dr. Murray, then, being a chivalrous man, and accustomed to attempt desperate enterprises, sallies forth in defence of the order of Jesuits, and endeavours to prove their doctrines consistent with Gospel morality. And by screwing up the Jesuit teaching as high as he can, and the Gospel morality down as low as he can, he makes something like an attempt to get the two to agree. We will do Dr. Murray the justice to say, at the outset, that he seems to us a much better man than his system; he seems to us to be a plain, outspoken man, with no love for equivocation himself, though in his love for the Jesuits he tries to put the best construction on their doctrines, and exerts the utmost of his ingenuity to put the most presentable of them in a plausible light.

The impatience with which we turned to Dr. Murray's pages for information as to the Jesuit doctrines, was destined to meet with a check; for the learned professor seemed in as little hurry to enter on the subject of his essay as the condemned criminal of old, who

"Now fitted the halter, now traversed the cart,  
And oft took his leave, but was loath to depart."

The first thirty pages of his essay contain an account of the manner in which theology is taught at Maynooth, but are more particularly devoted to the explanation of the fact (?) that while respectable Roman Catholic theologians alway-

fairly state the Protestant doctrines, Protestant divines constantly misrepresent the Roman Catholic doctrines. The principal explanation of this given by Dr. Murray is, that the Roman Catholic books of divinity are very dry and repulsive, and can only be read with ease, even by their own professors, after some years of teaching, while Protestant divinity is quite easy reading, and is in a much plainer and more popular form. But it seems to us that there is an explanation which will much better account for the matter. When a statement is clear and consistent, it is likely that those who hear it will be able to understand it readily and repeat it correctly; whereas if it is only saved from contradiction and absurdity by subtle distinctions, it is probable that those who try to repeat it will not be able to do so without making its absurdity palpable. A China vase, if sound, may be carried from one place to another without injury; but if it consist of broken pieces carefully put together, with the cracked side turned away from the spectator, then, no doubt, it is likely to fall to pieces at the first touch from one who has not been trained to handle it discreetly.

After long preliminaries, however, Dr. Murray does come to the point at last; and here we soon find what an advantage he enjoys in not being committed to the defence of any particular book. He is at liberty to pass over in silence all the worst part of the Jesuit teaching, and only picks out the most presentable parts, as if they were fair specimens of the rest. We should like to cross-question him a little, and to ask whether he would undertake the defence of those instances of equivocation which we have already cited from Liguori. Would he think it innocent to deny a truth, with the phrase, "I say no," meaning only "I pronounce the word no;" or would he consider it right to deceive his hearers into the notion that some true thing which he had said was false, and without authority by telling them, "I said it out of my head," although, no doubt, the words did come out of his head. As far as we can guess the answer which Dr. Murray would make to these questions, he would endeavour to escape the painful necessity of condemning St. Liguori by insisting on the difference of usage in different countries. Dr. Murray tells us:—

"The meaning of each language is regulated by its own usage. For example—suppose that in Portugal [I am merely supposing a case; I am ignorant of the Portuguese language] it is customary for a person to disengage himself from a bore in the street, or from any other unpleasant company, by saying 'I have particular business at home.' In Portugal the phrase is by the supposition perfectly intelligible as a courteous way of getting rid of an intolerable social nuisance. Suppose that in Italy or England the words have not, from usage, this second meaning—then to use them in Italy or England with such meaning would clearly be to use an undiscoverable equivocation. . . . Hence it is evident, that equivocations which are discoverable in one language or country, may be undiscoverable in another. Therefore supposing them to be allowable in the former language or country, it does not follow that they are allowable in the latter; and vice versa, supposing them to be unlawful in the latter, it does not follow that they are unlawful in the former; therefore, it does not follow that because a number of Italian and Spanish divines state that certain equivocations are intelligible, and hence (with the restrictions to be named by and bye) allowable in their country; therefore, the same equivocations are intelligible and allowable in ours. Neither does it follow that because such equivocations are unlawful here, they are, therefore, unlawful there. The principles in which all approved theologians agree I hold to be perfectly sound, and these very principles lead me to reject some of the decisions of those theologians on particular cases, so far as these countries are concerned. Whether the decisions are just, even in the circumstances to which they were intended to apply, it comes as little within my province as it comes within my power to determine."

We think this extract, then, pretty well enables us to judge what answer Dr. Murray would give, supposing that he were asked, "Is it lawful to deny something true by answering 'I say no.'?" He would reply, "No, this is not allowable in England and Ireland." "Well, then, do you condemn St. Liguori, who considers this answer allowable?" "You must excuse me from passing judgment on this question. I have not lived long in Italy to say whether such an equivocation may not be a discoverable one in that country, and, therefore, there allowable." An ingenious way, no doubt, to escape coming into collision with a canonized saint. But we may appeal to the common sense of our readers whether such a defence will bear examination. No doubt the first Jesuit who devised the ingenious dodge of answering, "I say no," made use of a perfectly undiscoverable equivocation; and, therefore, according to Dr. Murray's principles, was guilty of a sin. But by degrees the device comes to be seen through, and sharp fellows come to know that they must not be satisfied if any one answer them, "I say no," without sifting deeper, and finding out whether he only means to utter the word no, or whether he is giving them a denial. When things have come to this state, according to Dr. Murray's principles the equivocation has become a discoverable one, and, if any one be deceived by it, he has only himself to blame for not having used proper attention. The person who answers, "I say no," does not deceive, but suffers his hearer to deceive himself. According to Dr. Murray's

principles, it would be a sin in an upright English gentleman to make use of equivocation, for his hearers would naturally think that he was employing words in their clear obvious sense, and the equivocation would be undiscoverable; but, if a tricky Italian employ equivocation, it is no sin, for if his hearers take his words in their most obvious sense they have only themselves to blame for their unparable neglect in supposing that he will not take advantage of any double sense of which his words may be susceptible. And thus Liguori's declaring certain equivocations to be innocent will soon have the effect of *making* them to be innocent; for, when a man declares himself to be a disciple and admirer of Liguori's, no person of proper attention can think it strange if he employs equivocations which that saint has pronounced to be allowable; and, therefore, such equivocations are *discoverable* in his mouth though not in that of another. We think it follows as the legitimate consequence of Dr. Murray's principles, that a man may, if he lie often enough, make it impossible for himself to lie at all. As long as you are a miserable half-hearted liar you will be perpetually falling into sin; but lie boldly and establish a character for yourself, and by the time that you have become so thorough-paced a liar that no sensible man will believe you—by the time that any wise man will suspect any assertion you make of containing some equivocation or mental reservation—then what would be lies in another man's mouth would be only *discoverable equivocation* in yours. This, we think, is the necessary consequence of Dr. Murray's attempt to be friends at once with truth and with St. Liguori, and of his endeavour to make out that what would be a lie in an Englishman would be no lie in an Italian or Spanish disciple of Liguori.

All through his defence Dr. Murray's individual dislike to deceit leads him to substitute a better morality of his own instead of that which he is called on to advocate. For instance, when the case is discussed of a witness in a court of justice, who, it is admitted, is generally bound to tell the truth, one of the first exceptions mentioned by Liguori is the case of a confessor who is questioned concerning a sin which he had heard in confession. We suppose we are not to complain that when God's law—to speak the truth—comes into collision with the church's law—to keep the secret of the confessional—the former is compelled to give way. But we bring forward the subject to show how differently it is treated by Liguori and Dr. Murray. Liguori recommends the confessor to answer flat, that he does not know anything on the subject on which he is questioned, with the mental reservation, that he does not know as a man, but as a minister of Christ. And the reason he says is because the questioner has no right except to communicable knowledge, which that of a confessor is not. Dr. Murray's words, on the other hand, are as follows:—"A confessor cannot, in any conceivable circumstances, reveal what he has heard under the seal of sacramental confession. By doing so directly or indirectly, he would, according to the universally received doctrine, be guilty of a most heinous crime. This is known and always supposed in every Catholic country, and I take it in this country also. If, however, a doubt of this should exist in any case, the matter can be easily settled by the clergyman simply stating the Catholic doctrine before he takes the oath as a witness. The sacredness of the seal of confession is, I believe, respected by our judges. If the contrary should occur, the confessor is bound to suffer death rather than reveal confession." If, then, we understand Dr. Murray right, while St. Liguori recommends the confessor to deny all knowledge of the subject inquired of Dr. Murray advises what would naturally occur to an honest man, that he should refuse to answer, and persist in his refusal to the risk of his life. It may be said that St. Liguori, writing in a Roman Catholic country, only contemplated questions put by judges who would not intend their questions to refer to things known only under the seal of confession. The very next sentence in Liguori disproves the supposition. He says, that the same denial is to be given even if the questioner should ask whether the confessor have heard as minister of Christ; because the confessor is always to be supposed to answer as a man; for as a minister of Christ he cannot speak. It appears, then, that while Liguori recommends the confessor to deny his knowledge, because the questioner has no right to it, and to trust to a mental reservation to make his words true, Dr. Murray recommends the confessor to make sure that the questioner should understand that the denial does not extend to the case of things known under the seal of confession. Again, Dr. Murray is careful to inform us that equivocations are only to be used in cases of urgent necessity. He describes in a passage which we shall quote presently, the mischievous consequences of habitual equivocation on slight occasions. He gives as his examples, the case of a minister of state entrusted with a secret, the disclosure of which would entail some dreadful evils on the commonwealth; or the case of an assassin bent on murder, who should ask the son of his victim to tell him on pain of death where his father was to be found. But even if the reader should be tempted by these examples to admit the lawfulness of equivocation on cases of urgent necessity, is there not still good reason to doubt whether the doctrine defended by Dr. Murray is the same as that advocated by Liguori, who maintains that any honest end for keeping things good for the spirit or useful to the body, is a sufficient cause for equivocation; and who tells us a little farther on, that to swear even with equivocation (except in the case of trials or of contracts) an absolutely grave cause

is not required, and that any rational cause is sufficient, such as to free one's self from the troublesome and unjust questions of another.

Many of Dr. Murray's examples, too, would cause very little embarrassment to a person who was ignorant of the doctrine that it is lawful to tell a lie when speaking the truth is inconvenient. In the case just mentioned, if Lord Palmerston or Lord John Russell were questioned as to the progress of negotiation or any other state secret, by one who had no right to put such a question, we fancy they would not find it necessary to resort to falsehood, in order to reduce the questioner to silence; or, in the next case, suppose a lawyer engaged in a case, and entrusted by his client with a weighty secret bearing closely upon it, were to be pumped by a cunning emissary from the other side, we do not think he would, in most cases, find much difficulty in his course of proceeding. Indeed in this case Dr. Murray's education in these countries has suggested to him an answer not to be found in Lignori. He says that it would be best—nay, would be a strict duty—to say in such cases, "Sir, your question is impertinent, and I will not answer it," or words to this effect, or to remain silent, if either line could be taken without serious inconvenience, or if silence were not equivalent to a revelation of the secret. We believe that the course of conduct suggested here would afford the clue to the greater part of Dr. Murray's difficulties.

We must hurry on, or we might touch on another disagreeable case which Dr. Murray propounds. Suppose we had some cash in hands, and were asked for the loan of twenty pounds by a man notorious for not paying his debts, but still whom it would be inexpedient to offend by a flat refusal, Dr. Murray rules that in such a case it would be quite lawful to deny that we have got so much money. The decision is, at least, convenient.

But we wish to give our readers a favourable specimen of Dr. Murray, and shall, therefore, lay before them the passage to which we before alluded, in which he expresses his own dislike to the habit of equivocation—

"It is evident that if such a practice were allowed, no man would trust his neighbour for a single moment. I could not be sure but that every fifth or tenth sentence I hear does not involve an equivocation; and as I know not in what particular sentence the trap is hidden, I know not in which I may be caught, and I suspect all. Social intercourse would resemble a journey on a dark night, over a road full of pitfalls. I am not sure when I may tumble in, but I have no doubt that I shall go down somewhere, and I fall into a state of feverish uneasiness, which continues to the end. In trying to scan the speaker's mind, the understanding loses its uprightness of attitude and directness of movement, and acquires a wriggling, shuffling, uneasy action. It gets a mean and dishonest turn, like a man who accustoms himself to peep round corners and listen at keyholes. Every motion of the equivocator's tongue becomes as much distrusted as the motion of a pickpocket's fingers. . . . . A man who practises equivocation is always in the imminent danger of sheer lying. Lie he most certainly will from time to time; and the probability is, that, in the long run, the habit of equivocation will end in a habit of lying, as the habit of hard drinking often ends in a habit of downright drunkenness. . . . . The habitual equivocator is both mean, despicable, and ten times more hateful than the habitual liar. The latter makes his choice 'for better or worse,' the former woos truth openly, and pays his secret addresses to falsehood, without intending to wed either. To insincerity he adds meanness and hypocrisy, and either of the latter is detestable in every aspect and every relation."

These extracts justify us in saying that Dr. Murray is a better man than his system; but, after all, what is this passage more than an expansion of Mr. Macaulay's assertion, that the world could not exist if men were generally to do what Jesuit divines have taught that with a good conscience they may do. Can a habit of equivocation be a bad thing, and the single acts of equivocation be all innocent? How are people to be taught that they may, with a safe conscience, practise acts of equivocation and yet be prevented from forming the habit. It is pretty plain that if Liguori's doctrines be true they are still not good for common ears, and that the less the public are taught of them the better. This is just Dr. Murray's judgment. He says—"The duty of observing strict veracity, and the sin and odiousness of lying, especially of habitual and deliberate lying, are certainly fit subjects for the pulpit; nor can the Christian preacher too strongly command the one and repudiate the other. But if he does touch on equivocation he should reprobate it too; his plain and simple teaching should be condemnatory." And Dr. Murray cites, with approbation, the advice of an eminent divine—"To a person asking, *is it lawful to use equivocation or mental reservation?* the answer should be, *it is not lawful!*" What! when Lignori, and all approved Roman Catholic divines, teach that equivocation for a just cause is perfectly innocent, and when Dr. Murray has written a long essay to justify the doctrine, will he still tell an inquirer simply that equivocation is not lawful? The force of equivocation can no farther go. With this equivocation on equivocation we take our leave for the present.

#### THE SUCCESSION OF THE POPES.

ONE of the marks of the true Church which eminent Roman Catholic writers lay down is "apostolicity;" a very good mark in itself, and one which we heartily wish all Roman Catholics rightly to understand.

Bishop Milner thus defines the mark "apostolic"—"An uninterrupted series of successors of the apostles in every age since their time—that is to say, successors to their *doctrine*, to their *jurisdiction*, to their *orders*, and to their *mission*. Hence it follows, that no religious society whatever which cannot trace its succession in these **four** points up to the apostles has any claim to the characteristic title **APOSTOLICAL**."—End of Controversy, Letter xxviii.

It would seem that in applying this we must **FIRST** know what the apostles' doctrine was, before we can learn what Church is apostolical by tracing its succession in doctrine. This appears to us to be very sound and agreeable to reason; but we are bound to say that it is not exactly what Bishop Milner meant.

But, independent of the *truth* of doctrine, there may be a difficulty in tracing the *succession* of doctrine. For instance, it would be difficult to trace a succession of Popes holding the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception; because the present Pope is the first who has established that doctrine; so it would be unreasonable to expect in that point a *succession* in doctrine.

But there cannot be a succession in doctrine, or in anything else, unless there has been a succession of men. We propose, therefore, to begin at the beginning, and examine the succession of the Popes to each other.

We do not write either to under-rate or to exaggerate the importance of a succession of ministers in the Church wherever it can be shown (as it can in the Church of Ireland); we value and prize such an external manifestation and evidence of the perpetuity of the Church on earth. But where such an external manifestation is wanting, we do not therefore conclude that the continuity of the Church itself must have been broken, being entirely of the opinion of the learned Roman Catholic divine, Father Paul Sarpi, that Christ would have had a Church on earth, "although there should never more have been a Pope."—Treatise of Ecclesiastical Benefices, chap. 19.

It is, therefore, for the satisfaction of others, rather than for our own, that we undertake to trace the "succession of the Popes." Those Roman Catholics who are ready to stake the truth of the claims of their Church on the clearness of the succession of her Popes, may fairly expect to find the succession so clear that no Christian in any age could ever have had room to doubt who was the actual and lawful successor of St. Peter. If it should appear, as we proceed, that it has many times been a most puzzling question to find out the true successors, the fault is not in us, but in our materials; for we take our succession from the learned Jesuits, Labbe and Cossart, in their great work on the Councils of the Church.

We pass over for the present the question, who succeeded St. Peter as Pope. Roman Catholic writers are fond of telling us that several ancient writers—Eusebius, Irenaeus, Optatus, Tertullian, &c.—have given lists of the early Popes. But those Roman Catholic writers seldom quote the lists they speak of. The reason is, because the ancient lists differ from each other, and Roman Catholics do not know which list to choose.

It seems to us that if God had thought the succession of the Popes essential to the Church, he would have provided that we should know which list to rely on. If any Roman Catholic will give us a list of the first six Popes after St. Peter, we will discuss this subject further.

In the meantime, we proceed to consider the succession in after ages.

We know nothing which gives a better general view of the history of the Papacy, than the list of the Popes published by Labbe and Cossart in the "Concilia Generalia," vol. xvi. col. 130.

It is a simple list, stating the year in which each succeeded to the Papacy, and the time of his death.

Here and there a line is introduced, stating when two persons, or sometimes three or four persons, were claiming at the same time to be the successors of St. Peter.

We shall give each of these lines, prefixing the date preceding the schism.

A.D. 251. "The first Antipope, Novatian, the Heretic."

A.D. 366. "Felix II., so called by some."

A.D. 367. "The second Antipope, Ursicinus."

A.D. 418. "The third Antipope, Eulalius, the Archdeacon."

A.D. 498. "The fourth Antipope, Laurentius, the Archdeacon."

A.D. 530. "The fifth Antipope, Dioscorus."

A.D. 686. "A schism, Peter and Theodore being elected."

A.D. 687. "A schism, Theodore and Paschal being elected."

A.D. 757. "A schism, on account of Theophylact, the Archpresbyter."

A.D. 768. "Constantine, Antipope, brother of Toto, Duke of Nepi. (Here the Jesuits got tired of counting the Antipopes.)

A.D. 824. "Zinzimus gave occasion to a schism."

A.D. 844. "John, the Deacon, raised tumults against Sergius."

A.D. 847. "Here the *POPESS* Joan is absurdly inserted by some." (Note—The story of the *woman Pope* is told by Roman Catholic historians, *not* by Protestants.)

A.D. 890. "Sergius and Boniface VI. created tumults."

A.D. 896. "Romanus, the Galesian, intruded by force."

A.D. 963. "Leo VIII., the Antipope, put in by Otto."

A.D. 974. "Boniface VII., or Franco, Antipope."

A.D. 996. "John XVI., Antipope, by the faction of Crescensius."

A.D. 1013. "Gregory, the Antipope, is ejected by the Emperor."

A.D. 1043. "Silvester III., and John XX., the Archpresbyter of the Roman Church, Antipopes."

A.D. 1059. "John Mincius, called Benedict X., Antipope."

A.D. 1061. "Cadolus, the Antipope, called Honorius II."

A.D. 1080. "Clement III., Guibert of Ravenna, Antipope."

A.D. 1099. "Guibert being dead, THREE Antipopes in a short time."

A.D. 1118. "Mauricius Burdinus, Archbishop of Braga, Antipope."

A.D. 1124. "Callistus II., Theobald, yielded to Honorius."

A.D. 1130. "Peter Leonis, Anacletus II., Antipope. Gregory, called Victor III., Antipope."

A.D. 1159. "Octavian, called Victor IV., Antipope. Guido Cremonensis, called Paschal III., Antipope. John the Abbot, called Callistus III., Antipope."

(THREE Antipopes at one time was *too* much.)

A.D. 1268. "The See was vacant two years, six months, two days."

A.D. 1291. "The See was vacant two years, three months, two days."

A.D. 1313. "The See was vacant two years, three months, seventeen days."

A.D. 1378. "Robert of Geneva, called Clement VII., Antipope."

A.D. 1394. "Benedict XIII., Peter de Luna, Antipope."

A.D. 1415. "The Roman See was vacant two years, five months, ten days."

A.D. 1424. "Ægidius, Antipope, called Clement VIII."

A.D. 1439. "Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, Felix V., Antipope."

The above is a plain story, from the highest Roman Catholic authorities, and needs few comments.

ANTIPHOPE means "opposition Pope."

Our readers can count for themselves how often there have been "opposition Popes;" and how many "opposition Popes" there have been at a time.

If any one should suppose that it **MUST** have been always easy to see who was the true Pope, and who was the "opposition Pope," if he look *carefully* at the above list he will see his mistake.

Let him look to the year 890, in the above list, and he will see "Boniface VI." as a false Pope. Boniface VII. is set down as a false Pope in the year 974.

Boniface V. succeeded, in the year 617; Boniface VIII. in the year 1294.

There is no Pope Boniface VI. or Boniface VII., between them in the list of the Popes given in Bishop Milner's "End of Controversy."

How came this?

It could only happen in this way—Historians, writers, and people in general, reckoned Boniface VI. and Boniface VII. to be Popes; and, therefore, when another Boniface arose everybody called him Boniface VIII. This shows how commonly Boniface VI. and Boniface VII. were taken to be Popes.

If our readers will look over the list above given they will find that no less than **eighteen** of those who are now set down as "Antipopes" have numbers attached to their names.

There are **no** Popes of similar name and number in what is now counted the *true* list of the Popes.

For instance, there is a Pope John the 19th in the list of true Popes of the Church of Rome, and a Pope John the 21st; but there is no Pope John the 20th!

He who was counted Pope John the 20th while he was living, was put out of the list long after he was dead.

And so of all the other false Popes who have numbers to their names. They were counted Popes by multitudes while they were living, and were put out of the list long after they were dead, to try and make the list such as Roman Catholics would now wish it to have been.

The list, even now, might well be weeded a little more. There are worse weeds in it still than were ever cast out. But such weeding out in later times does little good to the multitudes who, in almost every age, were deceived by false Popes in their own day. The correction of such errors comes too late in after ages. If it be necessary to know the true Pope, men ought to know which he is while they are alive. There is no repentance nor knowledge in the grave.

Nor does there seem to be much hope in purgatory for those who were deceived by false Popes on earth. It does seem a case in which some mercy *might* be hoped for